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The Medical Malpractice System and the Payment of
Future Medical Damages: On Life Support Elsewhere,
Resuscitated in Louisiana

I. INTRODUCTION

Bill and Cheryl entered the hospital looking forward to the
birth of their first child. During labor that night, hospital staff
noticed that the baby's heart rate slowed significantly during
contractions. They called Cheryl's obstetrician (OB/GYN) at
home, who ordered that levels of Pitocin, a drug used to quicken
the labor process, be increased. Throughout the night, though, the
baby's heart rate continued to slow, and hospital staff called the
doctor again. The doctor did not come to the hospital.
When the doctor arrived the next morning, she performed a
Cesarean Section on Cheryl. The newborn, named Laura, required
oxygen to revive her. A CAT scan revealed that she sustained
substantial brain damage due to lack of oxygen during the delay in
her delivery. The jury in the subsequent medical malpractice trial
awarded Bill and Cheryl $2.7 million to pay for Laura's future
medical care.' This seemed like more than enough until their
attorneys took $900,000 in contingency fees. Now they do not
have enough money to pay for the care Laura will need for the rest
of her life. What will they do?
On September 27, 2006 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal found that the statutory cap on medical malpractice
damages is too low to properly compensate victims.2 While the
case has since been vacated and remanded, the court was correct,
because the $500,000 cap, which is still in effect but has lost two-

Copyright 2008, by LouISIANA LAW REVIEW.

1. Although the facts of this hypothetical were extracted from a real
medical malpractice scenario, the names and some facts have been altered. See
Janet, Jenner & Suggs, LLC, The MEDLAW Legal Team Recovers $3.7 Million
Jury Verdict in Cerebral Palsy/Medical Malpractice Case, 2007, http://www.
cerebral-palsy-injury.com/cerebral-palsy-compensation.html.
2. Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, APMC, 940 So. 2d 777, 781 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 2006), vacated,947 So. 2d 727 (La. 2007).
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3
thirds of its value since being enacted more than thirty years ago,
is inarguably Draconian. However, what the court did not note is
that Louisiana balances the seeming inequity of the low cap with a
unique system for the payment of future medical damages
(commonly known as "future medical"). Future medical damages
comprise the cost of all future medical care necessitated by
medical malpractice. 4 Louisiana offsets the low cap with the
Patient's Compensation Fund, which compensates malpractice
victims better than the standard tort scheme. In Louisiana, Laura's
parents would not have to worry about how to pay for her lifetime
of expensive future care.
This paper will demonstrate why the Louisiana system for the
payment of future medical damages is superior to others. Part II
gives a brief overview of the medical malpractice system and how
it generally handles damages. Part III exposes the negative
consequences of the traditional method for paying future medical,
with an emphasis on inadequate compensation to victims. Part IV
explains the relevant portions of the current medical malpractice
law in Louisiana and explains its system for paying future medical
The evaluation
damages.
Part V evaluates this system.
demonstrates how the system solves many of the inadequacies
revealed in Part III. Part VI concludes that while it has its own
unique caveats, the Louisiana system for the payment of future
medical damages surpasses others in its compensatory abilities and
is therefore more just for patients.

II.

ANATOMY OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM

Generally, private physicians and other healthcare providers
are legally required to maintain professional liability insurance that
will cover them in the event of an unfavorable medical malpractice
verdict. 5 A typical policy for physicians will pay malpractice
3. id.

4. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Caps and the Construction of Damages in
Medical MalpracticeCases, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 154, 154 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006)
[hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
5. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical Malpractice
System: Structure andPerformance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supranote 4, at

11, 13.
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victims a maximum of $1 million per claim, and pay out up to $3
million in total claims per year.6 Some healthcare providers
choose to supplement this primary layer insurance policy with
excess layer coverage to insure them in a situation where a
malpractice judgment exceeds the primary layer limit.7 The
insurance companies that provide primary and excess insurance are
usually private commercial carriers, though the number of
physician-owned
mutual insurance companies has increased in
8
recent years.
In order to maintain their medical malpractice insurance,
providers must pay an annual fee called a premium. Medical
malpractice premiums are a function of the degree of risk in the
physician's specialty and the expected costs of litigation in the
provider's geographic practice area. 9 Most insurance companies
do not base their premiums on individual experience ratings (the
number of claims against the healthcare provider) because such
ratings are too difficult to calculate accurately.' 0
Instead,
insurance companies will refuse to provide coverage for those
healthcare providers who have had numerous claims against
them. 1
Once a medical malpractice judgment of liability is rendered,
the victim is entitled to damages. Medical malpractice damages
include compensatory and punitive damages. 12 Compensatory
damages are broken down into economic and non-economic
damages. Economic damages include lost wages, rehabilitation
expenses, past medical expenses, and future medical care

6. CompHealth, Malpractice Insurance 1, http://www.comphealth.com/
pdf/residents/understandingmalpractice_insurance.pdf (last' visited Jan. 21,
2008).
7. Mello & Studdert, supranote 5, at 14.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative
Compensation for Medical Malpractice Injuries: Reconciling the Brave New
World of Patient Safety and the Torts System, 49 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 73, 87
(2005).
12. Sharkey, supra note 4, at 154. As a general rule, Louisiana does not
allow punitive damages. Killebrew v. Abbott Labs., 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La.
1978).
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expenses, 13 which are the focus of this paper. As mentioned
above, future medical expenses are those necessitated by medical
malpractice. 14 For instance, like other brain-injured babies, Laura
will probably need future medical care in the form of twenty-four
hour monitoring and a feeding tube, among other things.' 5 Noneconomic damages are awarded for pain and suffering, physical
impairment, 6inconvenience,
anguish, marital loss, and
1
disfigurement.
"Traditionally, awards are made in one lump-sum payment,
even when the amount awarded is intended to cover future medical
expenses and lost earnings."' 17 While most do not, some states
mandate that damages rising above a statutorily designated amount
must be paid in periodic payments over time.18 For example,
Colorado law mandates that all future medical awards above
$150,000 must be paid in periodic payments. 19 Some argue that
periodic payments are better for malpractice victims. They assert
that periodic payments help ensure 20that money needed for future
medical expenses remains available.
III. FLAT LINE: INCORRECT HANDLING OF FuTURE MEDICAL CARE
COSTS
The majority of states do not address the payment of future
medical damages in a maximally effective way. As noted above,
they are usually lumped under the general category of economic
damages. 2 1 This lack of special treatment is becoming more and
more of a problem because damage awards continue to rise, and "it
13. Health Coalition on Liability Access, Ending the Confusion: Economic,
Non-Economic and Punitive Damages, http://www.hcla.org/factsheets/2003-23Damages.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
14. Sharkey, supra note 4, at 154.
15. See Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1994).
16. Sharkey, supra note 4, at 154-55.
17. Emily V. Cornell, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, Dec. 5, 2002, at 6, http://www.
nga.org/Files/pdf/I 102MEDMALPRACTICE.pdf.
18. See Ronen Avraham, Databaseof State Tort Law Reforms (Nw. Law &
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 06-08, 2006), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=902711 #PaperDownload.
19. Id. at 25.
20. Cornell, supra note 17, at 6.
21. Sharkey, supra note 4, at 154.
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is clear that the rising value of payouts has been caused by an
increase in economic damages, not awards for [non-economic
damages like] pain and suffering." 22 In fact, awards for future
medical care are rising at a faster rate than total damages. 2 3 Since
future medical damages make up such a large proportion of
awards, the general failure to address the issue has several
dangerous consequences, especially-and most importantly-for
patients. The most glaring examples of these consequences are in
the area of obstetrics and gynecology, particularly in Florida in the
1970s and 1980s.
A. Consequencesfor Physicians and PrivateInsurers
The consequences of inefficient systems for the payment of
future medical damages are highly intertwined for all those in the
healthcare system, but especially physicians and private medical
malpractice insurers. There are two basic, unfavorable effects on
insurers that in turn affect physicians. First, insurance companies
24
must raise their premiums. Since "awards drive premiums,
insurance companies raise the annual premiums they charge in
order to keep up with claims payouts,25 or leave the state medical
market altogether. 26 In response to high claims payouts, Florida's
private medical malpractice insurers raised their premiums for
OB/GYNs by 395 percent between 1980 and 1986.27 In 1986,
22. Id.at 164.
23. Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis': Recent Trends
and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-23,
availableat http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.20vl.
24. Alexander Tabarrok & Amanda Agan, Medical Malpractice Awards,
Insurance, and Negligence: Which Are Related?, MANHATTAN INST. LEGAL
POL., May 2006, at 2, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjrl10.pdf
(providing a detailed discussion of statistical analysis of the relationship
between premiums and awards).
25. Id.
26. Donald J. Palmisano, The 20-Year Anniversary of the Louisiana
Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, "Act 817 of 1975": "A Rescue From
Danger": A Tribute to John C. Cooksey, MD, 147 J. LA. STATE MED. Soc. 481,
484 (1995). As of 1975, after four others left, the Hartford Insurance Company
and the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company were the only medical
malpractice insurers left in the state. Id.
27. Jill Horwitz & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensationfor Medical
Injury: A Case Study, 14 HEALTH AFF. 164, 166 (1995) (citing U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SIX STATE CASE STUDIES SHOW
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OB/GYN premiums were $59,537.28 Such a premium rise places a
financial strain on physicians. This strain may be so large that
medical students "opt out of high-risk specialties" 29 and doctors
relocate to states with lower premiums. 30 Additionally, physicians
may choose to retire3 1early to avoid the costs associated with
malpractice insurance.
The second effect of large future medical awards is that private
insurers may be forced to leave the medical market and stop
writing malpractice policies altogether. 32 As mentioned above,
sometimes insurers cannot keep up with increasingly high
economic damages awards.3 3 Between 1970 and 1975, over
twenty private medical malpractice insurers left the Florida market
as a result of high
claims payouts, making it difficult for doctors to
34
coverage.
find
B. Consequencesfor Patients
Deficient systems for the payment of future medical damages
have the dangerous consequence of unjustly leaving malpractice
victims inappropriately compensated. Often, those patients who
have been hurt the most by malpractice and need the most care do
not get it because of the limits private malpractice insurers place
on claims payouts. 35 These limited amounts must be enough to
pay for all financial consequences of the malpractice, including
lost earnings and complete medical care. 36 Often, verdicts that
would exceed insurers' limits are settled for the maximum
allowable amounts.
For instance, a commonly litigated
malpractice claim is against OB/GYNs for brain injuries caused to
COSTS STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS, Pub. No.
GAO/HRD-87-21, at 4 (1986)).
28. Id.
29. F. Dean Griffen, Opportunityfor Change, LPCF Q., March 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.lapcf.louisiana.gov/WebsiteActiveFiles/NewsLetter/
Newsletter.htm (follow March 2006, "PDF" hyperlink).
CLAIMS AND INSURANCE

30. Id.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Thorpe, supra note 23, at W4-27.
Cornell, supra note 17, at 1.
Palmisano, supra note 26, at 484.
Horwitz & Brennan, supra note 27, at 166.
Richards & McLean, supra note 11, at 75-76.

36. Id.
at 75.
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babies like Laura during delivery. 37 Verdicts for this kind of injury
represent the highest in medical malpractice, with a median award
of $2,050,000. 3 Given the common $1 million limit that private
insurers place on payouts, it is almost impossible for severely
injured patients like Laura to get the care they need. It is in suits
against institutional healthcare providers like hospitals that large
damages are actually paid.39 However, "[r]elying on institutional
providers to pay large claims further
limits the cases where
'
adequate compensation is available. AO
Most states do not specifically mandate that economic damages
be paid in periodic payments but instead allow for lump sum
payments. 41 Two of the main problems with lump sums are their
speculative nature and the possibility that patients might
64
"misallocate"
funds. 42 Lump sums are based on many variables
and thus are seldom precisely accurate as to how much money the
patient's care will require. 43
Misallocation occurs when patients use lump sums to pay for
things other than medical care and then exhaust their funds before
the necessity for care fully diminishes. 44 When this happens, those
states that do not effectively handle the payment of future medical
damages place themselves in a precarious position. Patients who
exhaust their funds may have to fall back on the public system and
become "wards of the state."45 It is the state's taxpayers, then, that
bear the burden of paying for the malpractice victim's medical
care. 46 The issue of misallocation of funds is also prevalent when

37. David M. Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still In: Florida's Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y. & L. 499, 502 (2000).
38. News Release, The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, "Who Will Deliver My Baby?" Ob-Gyns, Patients Push US
Senatefor Tort Reform (Apr. 28, 2003).
39. Richards & McLean, supra note 11, at 76.
40. Id.
41. See generally Avraham, supra note 18.
42. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Lump-Sum Versus PeriodicDamage Awards, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1981).
43. Id.at 133.
44. Id. at 141-42.
45. W.E. Sedgwick & William C. Judge, The Use of Annuities in Settlement
of PersonalInjury Cases, 41 INS. COUNSEL J. 584, 584 (1974).
46. Id. at 584.
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the victims of malpractice are very old or very young, like Laura.47
There is the risk that the caretakers of these patients will utilize the
money awarded for future medical care for themselves. 48 If
Laura's parents were in debt, for instance, they might use the
money awarded for her future care to pay off that debt instead of
directing it exclusively to Laura's care. This risk is slightly
tempered, though, by the fact that many states require or permit the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor's property in the
case of large
damages awards,49 thus providing a degree of
50
protection.
Even if malpractice insurers did not place limitations on the
amounts they will pay out and damages were not awarded in lump
sums, patients still would not be fully compensated because of
attorney contingency fees and transaction costs. Laura and her
parents encountered the problem of attorney contingency fees.
Usually, if an attorney wins a malpractice case, he or she takes a
large portion of the award as payment. 51 This amount is usually
about one-third of the total award, 52 but can reach fifty percent if
the case is appealed. 53 If the parents of a brain injured baby win a
malpractice claim against the delivering OB/GYN for $1 million in
damages, and the verdict is not appealed, approximately $333,333
will go to the attorney. While this system allows lawyers to earn
large sums of money by litigating a very narrow class of cases, it is
clearly unfair to patients.
54
Some states, like California, have capped contingency fees.
The California system allows attorneys to collect forty percent of
the first $50,000 of the award, thirty-three and one-third percent of
the second $50,000, twenty-five percent of the next $500,000, and
fifteen percent of any amount that exceeds $600,000."
In
California, if the parents of a brain injured baby recover $1 million
47. See generally Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REv. 1757
(2002).
48. Id. at 1804.
49. Id. at 1793.
50. Note, The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act: A New Method of Giving Money
and Securities, 45 IOWA L. REv. 390, 392 (1959).
51. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 62 (1991).
52. Id.
53. Richards & McLean, supra note 11, at 77.
54. Id.
55. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (2005).
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in damages, the attorney's fee will be approximately $221,665.
While such a cap reduces the degree of under-compensation, it still
allows a large portion of the award to go to attorneys' fees.
Transaction costs include case investigation fees, among other
things.56 Case investigation involves many costly preparations, the
expenses of which are passed on to clients. 57 Travel expenses,
copying records, and the payment of expert witnesses all subtract
from the malpractice victim's ultimate compensation. 58 These
costs can total as much as $50,000 to $100,000. 59 Contingency
fees, transaction costs, and lump sums all mean that in order to be
fully compensated for all necessary future care, a patient must
recover more than he or she will need for actual medical bills.6 °
The aforementioned costs all leave patients under-compensated
and without the care they need. The standard system, though, does
little to remedy these issues. In the 1980s, Louisiana instituted a
fairer system that would tackle the issue of proper compensation
for medical malpractice.
IV. "PADDLES PLEASE!": THE LOUISIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
SYSTEM

In the mid 1970s, the number of malpractice claims was
increasing, insurance premiums were rising, and both healthcare
providers and private malpractice insurers were leaving the
medical market. Like many other states, Louisiana found itself in
the midst of these troubling circumstances. 62 In an effort to
address 63this situation, the state adopted a new medical malpractice
system.

56. Richards & McLean, supra note 11, at 77.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 78.
60. WEILER, supra note 51, at 62.
61. Forest Dean Griffen, A Message from the Chairman, LPCF Q., Sept.
2005, at 2, http://www.lapcf.louisiana.gov/newsletter/issuel/PCF%20newsletter
%209-8-2005.pdf.
62. Palmisano, supra note 26, at 481.
63. See generally id.
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A. The LouisianaMedical MalpracticeAct: InitialIncarnation
In 1975, ophthalmologist John C. Cooksey introduced a new
Louisiana medical malpractice law to the state legislature that was
patterned after a recently passed Indiana law.64 The Indiana law
created a Patient Compensation Fund 65 and capped all damages at
$500,000.66 Cooksey garnered the support of the Louisiana State
Medical Society and urged the legislature to pass House Bill 1465,
which would become known as the Louisiana Medical Malpractice
Act (LMMA).6 7 Citing the support of the state's physicians as an
influence in his decision, Governor Edwards signed the bill into
law in 1975.68
The LMMA sought to remedy the problems that plagued
medical malpractice systems during the 1970s. 69 Limits on
recoverable damages for medical malpractice suits and the creation
of the Patient's Compensation Fund, which is essentially state-run
excess medical malpractice insurance for private healthcare
providers, were the solutions. 70 The LMMA applies to hospitals,
physicians, and other medical entities that fall within the statutory
definition of "healthcare provider." 71 As initially created, the
primary function of the Patient's Compensation Fund was to pay
medical malpractice damages in excess of the healthcare provider's
64. Id.; see also IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2007).
65. IND. STATE MED. ASS'N, A HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY ISSUE:
INDIANA COMPENSATION ACT FOR PATIENTS (INCAP) (2003), http://www.
ismanet.org/pdfl'NCAPWhitePaper.pdf.
66. § 34-18-14-3. The damage cap has been raised to $1,250,000 for all
malpractice occurring after July 1, 1999. Id.
67. Palmisano, supra note 26, at 481.
68. Id.at 482; see also 1975 La. Acts No. 817.
69. Palmisano, supra note 26, at 481.
70. 1975 La. Acts No. 817.
71. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41(A)(1) (2007) ('Health care
provider' means a person, partnership, limited liability partnership, limited
liability company, corporation, facility, or institution licensed or certified by this
state to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital,
nursing home, community blood center, tissue bank, dentist, registered or
licensed practical nurse or certified nurse assistant, offshore health service
provider, ambulance service under circumstances in which the provisions of
R.S. 40:1299.39 are not applicable, certified registered nurse anesthetist, nurse
midwife, licensed midwife, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
physical therapist, occupational therapist, psychologist, social worker, licensed
professional counselor, licensed perfusionist, or any nonprofit facility
considered tax-exempt. .. ").
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personal $100,000 liability up to the $500,000 cap. 7 2 The Fund
will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.
The LMMA also created medical review panels. Before a
patient can bring a malpractice suit against a healthcareprovider in
court, the patient must present the claim to a panel, which is
comprised of three healthcare providers and one attorney. 74 The
review panel then decides if the evidence shows that the defendant
healthcare
provider failed to act with the necessary standard of
5
7

care.

In order to be eligible for the LMMA's benefits of claims
coverage and limitation on damages, healthcare providers must
meet specific qualifications. Each provider must provide proof of
"financial responsibility" 76 and pay an annual surcharge to the
Patient's Compensation Fund." If a healthcare provider does not
meet these requirements, it is not covered by the fund. 78 Each
provider must demonstrate that it has a primary layer of
malpractice insurance-financial responsibility-of at least
$100,000. 79 This primary layer of insurance can be from a private
insurer or the provider may be self-insured. Those who self-insure
must demonstrate financial responsibility of at least $125,000.80
Each provider must also pay an annual surcharge to the
Patient's Compensation Fund. 81 This surcharge payment is based
on a "reserve" system, as opposed to a "pay-as-you-go" system,
82
which other states with patient compensation funds utilize.
When healthcare providers pay the surcharge into the Louisiana
Patient's Compensation Fund, they are creating a reserve with

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

1975 La. Acts No. 817.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(B) (2007).
§ 40:1299.47(C).
§ 40:1299.47(G).
§ 40:1299.42(A)(1).
§ 40:1299.42(A)(2).
§ 40:1299.42(A)(1)-(2).
§ 40:1299.42(E).
Id.
§ 40:1299.42(A)(2).

REPORT OF THE JOINT INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MIssouRI HEALTH CARE
STABILIZATION FuND, MissouRI GENERAL ASSEMBLY 11 (2005) [hereinafter
REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND].
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which the claims in the coming year will be paid. 83 In a pay-asyou-go system, providers are paying for previous years' claims.8 4
The Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission determines the
amount of the surcharge. 85 Providers are placed into one of several
classes determined by specialty, and the surcharge is assessed
based on those classes. 86 At the end of each calendar year, when
all claims have been paid, if the Patient's Compensation Fund
exceeds $15 million, the Insurance Rating Commission can lower
the surcharge. 87 However, the LMMA also mandates that the fund
must maintain a thirty percent surplus at all times. 88 If it does 9not,
8
the Insurance Rating Commission cannot lower the surcharge.
The LMMA places a $500,000 limit on an award of damages
for medical malpractice. 90 Initially, the statute stated that this
$500,000 was the "total amount recoverable," meaning that 9it1
accounted for both economic and non-economic damages.
Future medical damages have since been excluded from the cap
though, and this exclusion will be addressed later.92 Providers are
only liable for up to $100,000 of the damages award. 93 Their
primary layer (private insurance) pays this sum. If the award is
higher than $100,000 the Patient's
Compensation Fund pays the
94
cap.
$500,000
the
to
up
remainder
This $500,000 cap on damages is strikingly low compared to
other states' caps. For example, Indiana's Medical Malpractice
Act, after which the LMMA was modeled, now caps damages at
$1,250,000. 95 Additionally, many other states distinguish between
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. § 40:1299.44(A)(2) (2007).
86. See LOUISIANA PATIENT'S COMPENSATION FUND, RATE MANUAL
(2006), http://www.lapcf.state.la.us/rateman/2004/PCF%2ORate%2OManual%20
2004.doc [hereinafter RATE MANUAL] (classifying providers based on their
specialty as designated by their primary insurance). See also E-mail from
Lorraine LeBlanc, Executive Director, Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund,
to author (Nov. 7, 2006, 02:21 CST) (on file with author).
87. § 40:1299.44(A)(6).
88. § 40:1299.44(A)(6)(a).
89. § 40:1299.44(A)(6)(b).
90. § 40:1299.42(B)(1).
91. 1975 La. Acts No. 817.
92. § 40:1299.43(D) (2007).
93. § 40:1299.42(B)(2).
94. § 40:1299.42(B)(3)(a).
95. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3(a)(3) (West 2005).

2008]

COMMENTS

economic and non-economic damages when imposing limitations.
96
These states generally limit only non-economic damages.
Until very recently, the $500,000 cap on damages endured and
courts even expressly held it constitutional.97 However, on
September 27, 2006, in Arrington v. ER Physicians Group, APMC,
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal found that the cap no
longer provides an adequate remedy. 98 In reaching its decision, the
court reasoned that since the value of the dollar has depreciated
since 1975 when the legislature first capped damages, the
$500,000 cap is actually a $160,000 cap by today's standards. 99
The propensity for change has also made its way into the
legislative branch of the Louisiana state government. A bill has
been introduced into the legislature that would amend the LMMA
to exclude all economic damages from the $500,000 cap.' 00 While
change may be in the cap's future, the LMMA's success, and
particularly the success of the portion dealing with the payment of
future medical damages, indicates that the remaining provisions
will endure.
B. The Louisiana Medical MalpracticeAct: Reincarnationwith
FutureMedical
In 1984, the Louisiana legislature made a revolutionary
amendment to the LMMA with respect to future medical
damages.' 0 ' The purpose of this amendment was twofold. One
purpose was "to grant severely injured malpractice victims, who
have been deprived by the cap of compensation for any necessary
96. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.1483 (West 2005).
97. Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517 (La.
1992); LaMark v. NME Hosp., Inc., 542 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989);
Williams v. Kushner, 524 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
98. 940 So. 2d 777, 781 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006), vacated, 947 So. 2d 727
(La. 2007). The cap remains in tact, despite this case's procedural posture. §
40:1299.42(B)(1).
99. Arrington, 940 So. 2d at 781.
100. H.B. 1228, 32nd Reg. Sess. (La. 2006). If the legislature does remove
the cap from economic damages, as long as the LMMA still mandates that all
future medical must be paid exclusively from the Patient's Compensation Fund,
the fund will remain an invaluable part of the Louisiana medical malpractice
system.
101. 1984 La. Acts No. 435.
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medical service, a speedy, convenient, and inexpensive
administrative remedy for the payment of actually incurred medical
02
expenses, without limit except as tailored to the patient's needs."'
The other purpose was "to provide cost-effective, actuarially sound
methods for financing and delivering compensation
for medical
10 3
malpractice."
medical
by
services necessitated
The original 1975 version of the law lumped future medical
damages under the $500,000 cap. 1 4 The amended law now
10 5
excludes the cost of "future medical care and related benefits"'
from the $500,000 cap on damages and mandates that future
10 6
medical damages be paid by the Patient's Compensation Fund.
According to the LMMA, "future medical care and related
benefits" are "all reasonable medical, surgical, hospitalization,
rehabilitation, and custodial services and includes drugs, prosthetic
devices, and other similar materials reasonably necessary in the
07
provision of such services, incurred after the date of the injury."'
A patient who wishes to be compensated through the fund must
file a claim with the Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight
Board, and a medical review panel then reviews the claim before it
goes to trial.10 8 Juries that sit on medical malpractice trials are
given a specific interrogatory asking if the victim needs future
medical and the approximate cost of such future medical
expenses. 10 9 If the jury finds that a victim is in need of future
medical care, these costs are separated from the remainder of
damages and paid by the Patient's Compensation Fund; all other
damages must fall under the $500,000 cap." l0 It is important to
note that Louisiana follows the collateral source rule, which states
that "a tort-feasor may not benefit, and an injured plaintiffs tort
recovery may not be diminished, because of benefits received by
the plaintiff from sources independent of the tort-feasor's
102. Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So. 2d 1210, 1216-17 (La. 1994).
103. Id.
104. 1975 La. Acts No. 817 (enacted as LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
40:1299.42(B) (2007)).
105. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B).
106. Id.
107. § 40:1299.43(B)(1).
108. § 40:1299.47(A).
109. § 40:1299.43(A)(2).
110. § 40:1299.43(A)(4).
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procuration or contribution.""' This means that the healthcare
provider being sued cannot seek to decrease the damages award by
introducing evidence that the victim has already received
the healthcare provider, like
compensation from sources other 1than
12
insurance.
health
own
the victim's
The method in which the Patient's Compensation Fund pays
future medical is what makes the Louisiana system notable.
Instead of taking the cost of future medical damages recommended
by the jury and giving the victim a lump sum in that amount, the
Patient's Compensation Fund pays the cost of future medical "as
incurred and presented for payment" from the time the malpractice
occurred. 13 The fund is then either billed directly by the
healthcare provider treating the patient or it reimburses the
patient.11 4 This means, for instance, that Laura's parents would
receive no money until her care has actually begun. The Fund also
pays for any medical costs incurred as a result of malpractice, but
before the judgment has been rendered."i 5 In order to ensure that
patients are not claiming payment for unnecessary medical
expenses, the Patient's Compensation Fund can require medical
needs every six months, and more often
checkups of the patient's
6
order."1
court
a
with
C. JurisprudenceClarifyingIssues Related to the Patient's
CompensationFund
Since its inception, Louisiana courts have helped to clarify
functions and workings of the fund. A major case related to
LMMA and the Patient's Compensation Fund is Kelty
Brumfield."17 This case helped to clarify the purpose of
Patient's Compensation Fund. It stated that the goal of

the
the
v.
the
the

111. Williamson v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., Inc., 559 So. 2d 929, 934 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1990).
112. David Schap & Andrew Feeley, (Much) More on the Collateral Source
Rule (Coll. of Holy Cross Dept. of Econ. Faculty Research Series, Paper No. 06-05,
2006), http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/RePEc/Schap_Collaterall
.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
113. § 40:1299.43(A)(4).
114. E-mail from Lorraine LeBlanc, supra note 84.
115. Id.
116. § 40:1299.43(G).
117. 633 So. 2d 1210, 1218 (La. 1994).
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legislation was to "remedy... the damage cap's harsh tendency to
,118
prune recovery inversely to the injury ....
The Kelty case also held that non-medical professional parents
could make claims to the fund for services they rendered in caring
for a child victim of malpractice'1l9 For compensation, the parent
must show that there is a need for the services, establish the
reasonableness of the fee, and must show the extent and duration
of the services.12 0 The Keltys' daughter, Anne Mary, suffered
from a lack of oxygen during delivery. 12 1 As a result, she was
severely brain-damaged and physically handicapped. 122 The
Keltys undertook to care for Anne Mary themselves instead of
placing her in a facility or hiring outside caretakers. 123 She
required four feedings a day through a gastrointestinal tube, with
124
the first feeding at 8:45 a.m. and the last ending at 2:10 a.m.
The Keltys provided physical and occupational therapy and bathed
her once a day, which required the help of both parents. 125 The
Keltys also monitored Anne Mary's gag reflex twenty-four hours a
day to prevent her from lethally aspirating vomit. 126 The court
used the standard rate paid to nurses and other caretakers in order
27
to calculate how much compensation the Keltys should receive.
Hall v. Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. held that the principle of
comparative fault applies to awards from the Patient's
Compensation Fund. 12
When there are multiple causes of a
plaintiffs injury, and medical malpractice is one of those causes,
the fund is only responsible for paying for the healthcare
provider's percentage of that fault if it rises above $100,000.129
The plaintiff in Hall sued both her doctor and pharmacy for
malpractice which contributed to a permanently debilitating
118. Id. at 1217.
119. Kelty v. Brumfield, 691 So. 2d 242, 245 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997), writ
denied,693 So. 2d 800 (La. 1997).
120. Id.at 247.
121. Id.at244.
122. Id.
123. Id.at 246.
124. Id,
125. Id.
126. Id,
127. Id.at 247.
128. 848 So. 2d 559, 568 (La. 2003).
129. Id.at 567.
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disorder.130 The jury found that her doctor was eighty-five percent
at fault and the pharmacist was ten percent at fault.' 31
V. FUTURE MEDICAL RESUSCITATED: THE LOUISIANA SYSTEM

In implementing the Patient's Compensation Fund and
providing for the separate treatment of future medical damages,
Louisiana has set itself apart from the forty-nine other states.
132
While twelve other states have patient's compensation funds,
none pay for future medical care necessitated by medical
malpractice the way that Louisiana does.' 33 In implementing this
unique system, Louisiana has successfully addressed the issues that
other states struggle with, and, most importantly, has addressed the
issue of patient compensation.
A. Consequences of the LouisianaSystem for Physiciansand
PrivateInsurance Companies
The Louisiana system for the payment of future medical
damages has several favorable effects for both physicians and
private insurance companies. By removing the burden of paying
future medical damages from private insurance companies, those
companies are able to keep their insurance premiums stable.' 3 4 By
virtue of the cap and the fund's payment of future medical
damages, private insurers know that they will only be responsible
for up to $100,000.135 This means that they can more accurately
predict what their future expenditures will be. As a result, private
insurers can keep annual premiums relatively low and stable for

130.
131.
132.

Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Griffen, supra note 61, at 2. The Pennsylvania fund is currently being

phased out. GEORGE COPPOLO & KEvIN MCCARTHY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT

No. 2003-R-0606:

PATIENT COMPENSATION FUNDS AND REINSURANCE FOR

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 2 (2003), available at http://www.cga.ct.

gov/2003/olrdata/ins/rpt/2003-R-0606.htm.
133. See generally REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82. The other
states with patient compensation funds pay future medical damages in the same
way that states without funds pay them--in either capped or uncapped lump sum
payments. COPPOLO & MCCARTHY, supra note 132, at 6.
134. REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82, at 15.
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44(A)(6) (2007).
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healthcare providers. 136 For example, the Government Accounting
Office found that the average increase in private insurance
premiums for states with caps like Louisiana's was just nine
percent between 2001 and 2002, compared to a twenty-nine
percent increase in states with limited reforms. 137 While some
premium increases may be inevitable, it is clear that Louisiana's
reforms make a large impact on relative premium stability.
The ability to predict future claims expenditures also means
that private insurers are more likely to stay in the medical
market.1 38 The presence of the state-run Patient's Compensation
Fund helps to ensure the availability of excess layer insurance for
doctors. Since it is run by the state and established by law, the
fund does not leave the medical market during
a malpractice crisis
139
do.
companies
insurance
the way private
Critics may argue that since physicians are essentially paying
two premiums, one to their primary private insurer and one in the
form of a surcharge to the Patient's Compensation Fund, 140 the
fund does not truly address the issue of malpractice insurance
affordability.14 ' However, because the fund pays for all future
medical expenses without limit, it removes a significant financial
burden from physicians and other providers. Since private insurers
place limits on the amount they will pay out, physicians may be
forced to purchase private excess layer insurance to protect
themselves from damage awards that exceed their primary layer
limits. 142 This excess layer insurance is often more expensive than
the surcharge paid to the fund. 143 So, if doctors are going to
136. REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82, at 15.
137. Medical MalpracticeInsurance: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on
Wellness and Human Rights, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives,GAO-04-128T, at 11 (2003) (statement of Richard J. Hillman,
Director Financial Markets and Community Investment, and Kathryn G. Allen,
Director Health Care-Medicaid and Private Health Insurance Issues). "States
with caps like Louisiana's" refers to the eight states used in the GAO study that
have $500,000 damage caps on non-economic damages.
138.

REPORTON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82, at 15.

139. Frank A. Sloan et al., Public Medical Malpractice Insurance: An
Analysis of State-OperatedPatient Compensation Funds, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
247, 265 (2005).
140. § 40:1299.42(A)(2).
141. REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82, at 15.
142. Mello & Studdert, supra note 5, at 14.
143. Id.
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purchase excess layer insurance and pay two premiums anyway, it
is actually more cost-effective for them to purchase it from the
Patient's Compensation Fund rather than from a private insurer.
Additionally, since healthcare providers can self-insure for only
$125,000,144 there is an incentive for private malpractice insurers
to keep their premiums low so that providers will buy primary
coverage from them instead of self-insuring.
B. Consequences of the LouisianaSystem for Patients
The greatest accomplishment of the Louisiana system for the
payment of future medical damages is most certainly its level of
justice, exemplified by the fact that victims are properly
compensated for their injuries. By excluding the cost of future
medical care from the $500,000 cap and paying it from the fund,
victims get all of the money they need to pay for the care
necessitated by medical malpractice. This is particularly important
for severely injured patients or those patients who are injured at a
young age, like Laura, as they require the most, and therefore most
expensive, care.
In order to ensure that patients can pay for the care they need,
the Louisiana regime essentially protects patients from themselves.
By taking lump sum amounts for future medical damages out of
the system and instead paying these damages "as incurred and
presented for payment,"' 5 the system prevents victims from using
46
the money designated for medical care for other things.
Additionally, this system protects the most vulnerable patients
from greedy caretakers.
The very young and elderly are
susceptible to the theft of their lump sum awards; these medical
malpractice victims might not even be aware that sometimes lifesustaining funds are being taken from them by those in whom they
place ultimate trust. 147 If she were born in Louisiana, there would
be no danger of Laura's parents using the money needed for her
future care to pay off debts.

144. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
145. § 40:1299.43(A)(4).
146. Rea, supra note 42, at 141-42.
147. See supra Part III.B.
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In addition to ensuring that patients are not undercompensated, the Louisiana system for the payment of future
medical damages also ensures that they are not over-compensated,
thereby wasting valuable funds. If a very elderly or severely
injured malpractice victim is awarded a large lump sum for future
medical damages, there is a chance that he or she may not live long
enough to utilize the full amount. 148 In such a case, the victim's
survivors might get windfalls in the form of an unutilized portion
of the lump sum. 149 This windfall is wasted money. Since the
Patient's Compensation Fund pays future medical expenses as they
are incurred, it eliminates the windfall problem. This aspect of the
system also demonstrates its true justice-it not only ensures that
patients get enough compensation, but only the compensation they
need.
Another negative consequence of the traditional system that
Louisiana avoids is that of exorbitant contingency fees for
attorneys. 150 Since there is no lump sum awarded for future
medical, attorneys cannot take large proportions of those awards as
their payment and patients are fully compensated. To ensure
payment, Louisiana malpractice attorneys make alternate fee
arrangements. For example, some attorneys only charge a fee on
the portion of the patient's award that is not designated for future
medical. 15 Under such arrangements, malpractice victims are still
completely able to fund their future medical care. The lack of
large contingency fees also helps to eliminate the problem of
"ambulance chasers" in search of large payouts for themselves.
Again, if she were born in Louisiana, Laura's parents would not
have to worry about insufficient funds for their daughter's care
because of high contingency fees.
The Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund does not place an
economic strain on the state in the way the standard system for the
payment of future medical care does. Even though it is an arm of

148. Rea, supra note 42, at 143.
149. Id.
150. See supra Part III.B.
151. E-mail from Jennifer Willis, Attorney, Cater and Willis, A Professional
Law Corporation, to author (December 6, 2006, 10:31 CST) (on file with

author).
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152
the state, the fund is completely financed by those enrolled in it.
While other states are forced to pay for the expensive future
medical care of those that have fallen into the public system and
become "wards of the state,"' 153 Louisiana barely needs to concern
itself with this issue. In Louisiana, taxpayers who had nothing to
do with the patient's harm are not forced to unjustly pay for a
doctor's malpractice. Since
the legislature created it, the fund has
54
fully paid out all claims.'

C. ComparativeEvaluation
While the above argument demonstrates the success of the
LMMA in patient compensation, it is very theoretical. A concrete
way to demonstrate the law's effectiveness is to compare it to
another system. While the LMMA is unique in that it covers
future medical care necessitated by all malpractice in all practice
areas, Virginia and Florida have compensation funds that cover
future medical care only for babies who sustain brain injuries
during delivery.155 Malpractice suits for these injuries are brought
against the delivering OB/GYNs. A look at the effects of the
Florida Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA)
affords the chance to evaluate the Louisiana Patient's
Compensation Fund against a similar system.
Florida instituted the NICA plan in 1988 in order to reform the
state's medical malpractice system with regard to those cases
involving birth related neurological injuries. 56 The NICA plan
provides no fault compensation to the families of brain injured
babies. Those families that wish to receive the compensation
57
provided by the plan cannot sue the negligent OB/GYN in tort.
Like the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund, the NICA plan
152. Ken Schnauder, $100 Million Dollar Claims Budget, the Norm?, LPCF
Q., July 2006, at 2, available at http://www.lapcf.louisiana.gov/WebsiteActive
Files/NewsLetter/Newsletter.htm (follow "PDF" hyperlink under "July 2006").
153. Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 45, at 584.
154. Economic Viability of the Fund, LPCF Q., Mar. 2006, at 6, available at
http://www.lapcf.louisiana.gov/WebsiteActiveFiles/NewsLetter/Newsletter.htm
(follow "PDF" hyperlink under "March 2006").
155. Saul Spigel, Virginia and Florida Child Brain Injury Compensation
Funds (Sept. 11, 2003), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/policy/2003-R-0620.htm.
156. Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 502.
157. Horwitz & Brennan, supra note 27, at 168.
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requires that covered physicians pay an annual fee of $5,000.158
Unlike the Louisiana system, though, this fee is not the plan's only
source of funding. It also levies a $250 fee on all Florida
physicians for licensure, private hospitals must pay $50
per live
159
NICA.
the
to
grant
one-time
a
made
state
the
and
birth,
Claims made to the NICA are reviewed for OB/GYN
substandard care by the Division of Administrative Hearings,
which determines if a baby's injury is covered by the NICA. 160 In
order to be covered, the injury must meet seven criteria. It must be
(1) to the brain or spinal cord of a (2) live infant (3)
weighing at least 2,500 grams at birth. It must be (4) caused
by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury and (5) occur in
the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the
immediate post delivery period .... The birth must take
place (6) in a hospital. Finally, as a consequence of the
injury, the infant must have been (7) rendered permanently
and substantially mentally and physically impaired.161
If the injuries are covered, the NICA pays for all necessary future
care exclusive of that covered by private insurance or government
programs and pays up to $100,000
in pain and suffering to the
1 62
fees.
attorney's
and
parents
baby's
Since Florida instituted the NICA, fewer obstetricians have
stopped practicing and fewer have decreased the number of
deliveries they perform. 163 In fact, once the state implemented the
NICA, the rate of OB/GYNs dropping out of practice in Florida
dropped to fifty percent of the overall U.S. OB/GYN drop-out
rate.'64 More than eighty
percent of Florida OB/GYNs participate
5
16
plan.
NICA
in the
Most importantly, the NICA has proven to provide necessary
money, and therefore care, to patients and their families. 166 One of
158. Id. at 169.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 168.
161. Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 503.
162. Spigel, supra note 155.
163. Horwitz & Brennan, supra note 27, at 175.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 177.
166. Kenney Shipley, NICA, An Alternative That Works for OBGYN,
http://www.flobgyn.org/se/2110.php (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
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the major tests facing any system of this nature is its actuarial
soundness. As of 2002, the NICA had accepted 161 claims at
approximately $1.85 million per claim. 167 At that time the NICA
had $299 million in reserves to pay for those claims. 168 To date,
the NICA's reserves have been enough to pay for all accepted
claims, but should it ever need to, the NICA can access an extra
$20 million from an Insurance Regulatory Trust Fund. 169 Also, if
the NICA's liability for existing claims reaches eighty percent of
its assets,
it reserves the ability to cut off applications for new
70
1
claims.
Since one of the central purposes of any tort system should be
compensation, this microcosm of a tort system should compensate
as well as possible. However, even though it deals with a narrow
class of victims, there is evidence that the NICA plan does not
meet this central purpose. While those that are permitted to file
claims under the NICA are well compensated, the system does not
allow all of those who deserve compensation to file claims.' 7 ' The
ultra-narrow seven part test ensures that cases involving blatant
negligence by physicians are not compensated if they do not meet
all of the criteria. 172

For instance, if Laura's severe brain injury was caused by
something other than oxygen deprivation during delayed delivery,
the NICA would not compensate her. One study shows that of the
birth-related injury cases it examined, only one-sixth met the
statutory criteria, whereas one-third involved sub-standard medical
care.17 3 Additionally, since the NICA plan reserves the right to cut
off claims applications at any time, there is a constant risk that
even those who meet the narrow criteria will not be compensated.
Given these figures, the NICA plan has done
only a modest job of
74
compensating birth-related brain injuries.'
Since the NICA plan gives claimant families the option of
pursuing a tort remedy or a no-fault remedy, it has not eliminated
167.

Spigel, supra note 155.

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 519.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 517.
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the problem of high jury awards for birth related neurological
injuries from Florida's tort system. 75 The strict criteria for
compensation make it difficult for claimants to get compensation
through the NICA plan, so they turn to the traditional tort
system. 176 This means that the problems associated with the
traditional payment of future medical care still plague Florida.
Given its design, the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund
should accomplish the goal of keeping OB/GYNs in the state at
least as well as the NICA plan does for Florida. The percentage of
OB/GYNs in Florida is twelve percent, which is larger than or
equal to the percentage in thirty-one other states. 17 7
The
percentage of OB/GYNs in Louisiana is fifteen percent, which 178
is
states.
other
forty-nine
in
percentage
the
to
equal
or
larger than
Louisiana is also one of fifteen states with between 500 and 1,100
OB/GYNs, and Florida is one of eleven states with over 1,100
OB/GYNs. 179 These figures demonstrate Louisiana's success
because it has accomplished both the goals of keeping OB/GYNs
in the state and of compensating victims with greater success than
Florida, a state with a specialized fund that exclusively covers
OB/GYNs, and it did so using a fund that covers all qualified
healthcare providers.
Even though Louisiana is charged with providing future
medical care for all victims of medical malpractice, and not just a
narrow class of victims like Florida, the Louisiana system is much
more adept at providing appropriate compensation. First, by
allowing compensation for all classes of victims and not utilizing a
stringent and exclusive set of criteria, Louisiana ensures that those
in need of compensation get it. Florida, by contrast, leaves a
significant number of malpractice victims uncompensated; these
victims include brain injured babies who do not meet the
criteria. 180 Second, since all other malpractice victims and many
brain injured babies must rely on the traditional tort scheme for
175. Id.
176. Id. at 523.
177. StateHealthFacts.org, Distribution of Nonfederal Primary Care Physicians
by Field, 2006, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparebar.jsp?ind=433&cat=-8
(last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 519.

2008]

COMMENTS

979

compensation, 181 they may fall back on the state to pay for their
care. 182 As discussed above, Louisiana avoids this problem by
funding all care. Third, Louisiana eliminates the issue of undercompensation because of attorney fees for
all patients, and not just
83
a very small class of them, like Florida.'
The Louisiana system also has positive effects beyond patient
compensation that the Florida system does not. The NICA plan
does not necessarily function to keep private malpractice insurers
in the state. Since NICA only covers care for a narrow class of
victims, private insurers are left to deal with all other malpractice
184
awards by themselves and with no state assistance.
Additionally, the NICA plan does not make claims expenditures
more predictable for private insurers because it only shifts the
burden of a small class of victims.185 Both of these things can
result in private insurers leaving the market. Louisiana, though,
makes claims payouts predictable for private insurers,
thereby
86
keeping malpractice insurance stable and available.'
A comparison to Florida's NICA plan reveals just how
effective the Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund is at
compensating malpractice victims. The NICA addresses the issue
of compensation for brain-injured babies that meet the seven
criteria, but it leaves all other claims to the traditional tort
system. 87 While it may have a functional design and is actuarially
sound, the NICA plan falls short of satisfying true compensatory
goals.
D. Clots in Louisiana s System?
Even in spite of its successes, the Patient's Compensation Fund
does have its own unique caveats. First, since the fund must
provide coverage to all doctors who meet the statutory criteria,
181. Id. at 523.
182. Sedgwick & Judge, supra note 45, at 584.
183. Spigel, supra note 155. Since the NICA only applies to a narrow class
of victims, it is only their attorney fees that are paid. See generally Studdert et
al., supra note 37.
184. Shipley, supra note 166 ("[P]roblems in the insurance arena have again
increased.").
185. Seeid.
186. REPORT ON MissouRI FUND, supra note 82, at 6.
187. Studdert et al., supranote 37, at 523.
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there are necessarily bad doctors participating who account for a
large numbers of claims.1 88 Those doctors for whom the fund has
paid out two or more claims over a five year period are assessed an
increase in their individual surcharges.' 89 This increase is a
percentage of the surcharge and cannot exceed fifty percent. 190 By
only increasing the amount they pay and not denying them
coverage, the law ensures that bad doctors will always be a part of
the Louisiana system. Clearly, this is also a negative consequence
for patients.
Second, while the reduction in high contingency fees helps
ensure that patients are fully compensated, this reduction may also
make it more difficult for poorer malpractice victims to find legal
representation. Contingency fee systems provide access to legal
representation for those who would not otherwise be able to pay a
fixed fee; 19 1 under these systems, victims get representation and
lawyers get paid-handsomely. Without the possibility of a large
payout for themselves, lawyers may be less likely to take on any
cases other than those that are sure winners. This means that those
victims who have suffered actual, but difficult to prove, harm from
malpractice may be left without a means for remedy against their
mal-practicing physicians. "To the extent that contingent fees give
the poor and middle class greater access to the courts, contingency
fees are a useful part of our legal system."' 92 While Louisiana's
reduction in contingent attorney fees better compensates those that
do actually get verdicts against tortfeasors, one downfall is that it
may actually prevent some victims from ever getting to court.
There is also the possibility that those with less than "sure fire"
cases who do find attorneys will get sub-par representation due to
the unlikelihood of a large verdict.
Third, while the Patient's Compensation Fund has been solvent
since its inception and looks as though it will remain solvent in the
future, 193 the Louisiana system is not as fiscally efficient as others.
By nature, a system that is open-ended and allows for the indefinite
188. REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82, at 17.
189. RATE MANUAL, supra note 86.
190. Id.
191. Angela Wennihan, Comment, Let's Put the Contingency Back in the
Contingency Fee, 49 SMU L. REV. 1639, 1649 (1996).
192. Id.at 1649.
193. Economic Viability of the Fund,supra note 154, at 6.
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payment of damages drags the claims process out, unlike a system
that awards a lump sum and closes the case. Since the fund is run
by the state, the state is then forced to remain involved in claims
indefinitely.
This flaw, though, is necessary to the fund's
construction, and the legislature should not attempt to "cure" it; the
very thing that makes the Patient's Compensation Fund fiscally
successful is its open ended nature and the lack of lump sum
payments.
VI. CONCLUSION: STABLE VITAL SIGNS?

As demonstrated above, Louisiana far surpasses other systems
in its ability to properly compensate victims of even the most
debilitating malpractice. However, it strikes a tenuous balance
between two issues that are at the center of the medical malpractice
system: justice and efficiency. The Louisiana system for the
payment of future medical damages is extremely just because it
carries out one of the most central goals of the medical malpractice
system: appropriate patient compensation.
It is in the areas of fiscal soundness and efficiency, though, that
Louisiana could make improvement. Even though it already
maintains a surplus, the Patient's Compensation Fund's future
could be better solidified if the state followed the NICA plan and
established an "emergency" fund-something that the fund could
access in the event of an unforeseeably large number of claims
with unforeseeably large dollar amounts that would otherwise
leave it insolvent. Such an emergency account would ensure that
compensation is always available to Louisiana malpractice victims,
even in economically uncertain times.
Another aspect in which the Fund can improve is its pool of
doctors. As discussed above, since it gives coverage to all those
who meet the statutory requirements, there are bad doctors
included within the system's coverage.' 9 4 Unlike the temporal
inefficiency, this is not a necessary evil. The Fund could eliminate
this problem by denying coverage to doctors with large numbers of
claims against them even if they meet the statutory criteria. This

194.

REPORT ON MISSOURI FUND, supra note 82, at 17.
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would both give an incentive to doctors to improve their practices
and protect patients.
The weight of the Fund's very minimal inefficiency and the
problem of bad doctors must be considered in light of what is most
important in a medical malpractice system. Justice in full and
appropriate patient compensation is of the utmost importance, and
though it may be inefficient time-wise, the Louisiana system is
highly efficient in compensating patients. Compensation, after all,
is one of the cornerstones of the Louisiana, and any, tort system. 95
"Sound lawmaking requires matching the characteristics of a
social issue with the characteristics of legal institutions to see
which institution[] ... is most likely to deal with the issue[] most
satisfactorily."'1 96 In matching the medical malpractice system's
goal of appropriate patient compensation with the characteristics of
the Patient's Compensation Fund, Louisiana has successfully
revolutionized the payment of future medical damages and has
created a wake of positive effects for the state medical malpractice
system as a whole. 197 Given its success in comparison to the
traditional system, the rest of the states should play a similar
"matching game," and look to Louisiana as an inspiration for
remodeling their systems
the way that Louisiana looked to Indiana
98
over thirty years ago. 1
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195. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2007).
196. Roger B. Dworkin, The Process Paradigm: Rethinking Medical
Malpractice,41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 509, 510 (2006).
197. See supra PartV.
198.

Palmisano, supra note 26, at 481.
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